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While there has been debate as to what the religion 
clauses protect, nearly all observers would agree that the First 
Amendment prohibits the federal government from establishing 
a national religion.1  Yet, from 1882 to 1932, the federal govern-
ment subsidized the conversion of Native Americans to Christi-
anity, while simultaneously banning Native American spiritual 
practices.2 
Moreover, courts have treated Native American relig-
ions differently from “mainstream”3 Judeo-Christian religions 
for much of this nation’s history.  Beginning with Johnson v. 
M’Intosh, the Supreme Court noted that the “character and relig-
ion” of the Native Americans stood in stark contrast to the 
“superior genius of Europe,” helping to justify European control 
of the land.4  In exchange, the Europeans gave the Native 
Americans civilization and Christianity, believing this to be 
“ample compensation.”5  M’Intosh’s view of the Native Ameri-
can religions as being somehow inferior to those of Western 
Europe thus informs the Court’s subsequent unbalanced treat-
ment of Native Americans in Free Exercise Clause jurispru-
dence. 
This article will discuss the extent to which the Free 
Exercise Clause creates rights to freely exercise religion for Na-
tive Americans in comparison with adherents of mainstream 
religions and the effects, if any, the Religious Freedom Restora-
tion Act (“RFRA”) has had on such rights.6  Section II of this 
article examines the law governing Native American land use, 
including the First Amendment, the American Indian Religious 
Freedom Act (“AIRFA”), and the RFRA.  Section III illustrates 
some key issues arising in Free Exercise Clause jurisprudence 
cases: (a) how central an asserted right must be for the courts to 
recognize that the right must be protected from government ac-
tion; (b) how substantial a burden on religion must be to be pro-
tected under RFRA; and (c) what constitutes a compelling gov-
ernment interest.  Section IV reviews Free Exercise Clause juris-
prudence in general, with an emphasis on Native American Free 
Exercise Clause jurisprudence, to illustrate the difference in ap-
plication of the clause to mainstream religions as opposed to 
Native American religions.  Section V analyzes and predicts the 
manner in which Native American religious freedoms are pro-
tected, positing that although the law has historically provided 
little protection for Native American religions, courts may now 
be more receptive to securing Native American religious free-
doms under RFRA. 
 
 
THE LAW GOVERNING RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 
 
The free exercise of religion in the United States is se-
cured first and foremost by the Bill of Rights.  The First Amend-
ment states that “Congress shall make no law respecting an es-
tablishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof 
…”7 Taken together, the Establishment and Free Exercise 
clauses prohibit the government from establishing a state relig-
ion and prevent the government from unduly restricting the exer-
cise of religious freedoms. 
Congress has also passed statutes to effectuate the pur-
poses of the First Amendment with regard to religion.  The 
AIRFA protects Native Americans’ rights to “believe, express, 
and exercise” their traditional religions, “including but not lim-
ited to access to sites, use and possession of sacred objects, and 
the freedom to worship through ceremonials and traditional 
rites.”8  The AIRFA initially offered only weak protection, how-
ever, and Congress had to amend the law in response to a land-
mark Supreme Court case concerning religious use of peyote. 
In Employment Division v. Smith the Supreme Court 
upheld a statute barring the use of peyote even for religious rea-
sons. 9  The Court found that neutral, generally applicable laws 
could be applied to religious practices even when they substan-
tially burden the free exercise of religion and were not supported 
by a compelling government interest.  In response to Smith, 
Congress amended the AIRFA to allow the use of peyote in reli-
gious rituals10 and passed the RFRA.11 
The RFRA prohibits the government from substantially 
burdening the free exercise of religion unless it can show a com-
pelling interest, and accomplish its ends through the least restric-
tive means possible.12  Although the RFRA was found unconsti-
tutional as applied to the states,13 it has been found constitutional 
as applied to the federal government.14 
 
 
GOVERNING PRINCIPLES OF JUDICIAL  
APPLICATION OF THE RFRA 
 
To determine whether the RFRA protects a right the 
courts consider several key interests such as: (a) the central na-
ture of the asserted right; (b) whether the burden on religion is 
substantial; and (c) what constitutes a compelling government 
interest.  Courts sometimes analyze the centrality of an infringed 
practice in determining the constitutionality of the governmental 
action.  RFRA defines exercise of religion as “any exercise of 
religion, whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system of 
religious belief.”15  Section IV of this article, addresses the ex-
tent to which a given religious practice must be central to trigger 
protection under the Free Exercise Clause or RFRA frameworks. 
The RFRA only protects religious practices that are 
substantially burdened by governmental action.16  Some of the 
approaches courts have taken to analyze the substantiality of the 
burden are: (a) making a case specific determination;17 (b) re-
quiring coercion of a religious adherent;18 (c) assuming suffi-
ciency of the asserted burden;19 and (d) requiring that an individ-
ual be prevented from engaging in religious conduct or having a 
religious experience.20 
Only compelling governmental interests can infringe 
the free exercise of religion.  The Supreme Court defines com-
pelling interests as interests of “the highest order and not other-
wise served.”21  Maintaining a uniform tax code,22 preserving 
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Native American culture,23 protecting bald and golden eagles,24 
and enforcing participation in the social security system25 are 
examples of compelling governmental interests. 
 
 
FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE 
 
This section will compare how courts have analyzed 
Free Exercise claims in a number of different scenarios, high-
lighting the differences between the treatment received by ad-




In Sherbert v. Verner, the Supreme Court considered 
the constitutionality of a South Carolina unemployment benefits 
scheme which exempted people from benefits if they were able 
to work but chose not to work.26  This scheme benefited Sunday 
worshippers while indirectly burdening the free exercise of re-
ligion of non-Sunday Sabbath-worshippers.  The Court, there-
fore, established a burden switching, or compelling burden 
test.27  For an action to be constitutional, the government must 
prove that it has a compelling interest in the regulation or action 
and that the means of achieving this interest are the least restric-
tive possible.28  Under this test, the Court noted that non-Sunday 
worshippers were forced to choose between taking the unem-
ployment benefits and observing their religion.29  The Court 
found such a choice repugnant under the Free Exercise Clause as 
an undue burden on religious freedom.30 
In Bowen v. Roy, the Court declined to apply the bur-
den switching test that it had used in Sherbert.31  Native Ameri-
can recipients of welfare benefits, on behalf of their minor child, 
objected to a government policy requiring the parents to submit 
the child’s social security number in order to receive benefits.  
The child’s father believed that the use of an arbitrary number as 
a means of identification contradicted his religious convictions, 
as it cut against an individual’s uniqueness.32  Though the Court 
recognized that the test applied in cases like Sherbert would 
seem to be applicable because an ostensibly neutral governmen-
tal policy was creating a burden on the free exercise of religious 
practice, it declined to do so. 
In Bowen, the court found a lesser burden upon a reli-
gious practice, and a higher governmental interest in enacting 
the regulation.33  The Court distinguished government regula-
tions that only “call[] for a choice between securing a govern-
mental benefit and adhering to a religious belief[]…from gov-
ernmental action or legislation that criminalizes religiously in-
spired activity or inescapably compels conduct that some find 
objectionable for religious reasons.”34  Moreover, the Court rea-
soned that the Sherbert ruling may be viewed "as a protection 
against unequal treatment rather than a grant of favored treat-
ment for the members of the religious sect."35  Therefore, while 
the Sherbert test was appropriate in cases involving unequal 
treatment,36 there was no need for a more stringent test in Bo-
wen. 
 
The Court appears to favor Judeo-Christian  
beliefs in determining whether or not to apply  
the Sherbert test. 
 
While the Court distinguished Bowen from Sherbert, 
both instances involved a religious adherent who had to choose 
between following his religion and receiving a government 
benefit.  The Bowen Court did not analyze the centrality of the 
infringed religious practice. It noted, however, that while the 
governmental interest was compelling, the religious practice was 
not substantially infringed.  In finding that the burden imposed 
on the Native American family was minor, the Court thus im-
plicitly regards that choosing to obey a Sabbath is more impor-
tant than a religious belief in an individual’s uniqueness. 
 
GOVERNMENTAL REGULATIONS THAT THREATEN THE EXIS-
TENCE OF A PARTICULAR RELIGION. 
 
The following cases illustrate the Court’s treatment of 
governmental practices that are neutral on their face, but indi-
rectly threaten the entire existence of religious practices. 
In Wisconsin v. Yoder, Wisconsin’s compulsory school-
ing law forced Amish parents to send their children to public 
school after the eighth grade violating core Amish religious be-
liefs.37  Although this law was a neutral government regulation, 
the Court applied the Sherbert test to find that Wisconsin’s law 
would debilitate the continuance of the Amish faith and there-
fore unduly burden the free exercise of religion. 38  The Court 
found that a regulation that is neutral in application may none-
theless “offend the constitutional requirement for governmental 
neutrality if it unduly burdens the free exercise of religion.”39  In 
Yoder, the neutral regulation ran afoul of the Free Exercise 
Clause because its neutral application would have the effect of 
debilitating the continuance of the Amish faith.  The Court thus 
expanded the scope of protection of the Free Exercise Clause. 
In Lyng v. Northwest Cemetery Protective Association, 
the government proposed the construction of a six-mile road 
cutting through a National Forest in northwestern California.40  
Though the Forest Service’s expert was against building the road 
because the area was viewed as indispensable41 to the religious 
practices of three Native American tribes, the Forest Service 
rejected that recommendation.42 
The tribes initially achieved some success in the lower 
courts.43  The district court acknowledged the centrality of the 
infringed right to their religious practice44 and issued an injunc-
tion.45  On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the granting of the 
injunction, holding that the road construction did not further a 
compelling state interest and violated the tribes’ free-exercise 
rights.46 
The Supreme Court reversed, distinguishing Lyng from 
other cases where the indirect burden was found unconstitutional 
in that they involved governmental coercion, while concluding 
that Lyng did not.47  The Court said the First Amendment does 
not involve what individuals can extract from the government; 
rather it involves what the government is prohibited from doing 
to the individual.48  Even if the road would destroy the tribes’ 
religion, the Court reasoned that because the governmental ac-
tion did not “coerce” the tribes into violating their religious ten-
ets, it did not sufficiently burden their religion.49 
In rejecting the tribes’ claim, the Court also stressed 
that the government has the prerogative to decide what to do 
with its own land.50  It feared that recognizing the claim could 
give rise to religious servitudes on government property, thereby 
inhibiting the government’s ability to advance the public inter-
est.51 
 
The Free Exercise Clause did not protect Native 
Americans from a governmental action that 
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threatened a religious practice because of the 
government’s interest in managing its land. 
 
The Lyng Court seemed to be holding that ostensibly 
neutral laws that eliminate Native American religious practices 
are constitutional so long as they are not an outright ban on the 
practicing of a religion.  Both Yoder and Lyng involve govern-
ment policies that risked the destruction of a religion, yet only in 
Lyng was the government action found to be constitutional.52  
The difference in the outcome of these cases resulted from the 
fact that the proposed action in Lyng involved government 
land.53  Therefore, the Lyng case can be interpreted to mean that 
the First Amendment cannot be invoked to challenge the govern-
ment’s use of real property.54 
Indeed, this 
interpretation of Lyng 
was expressed when the 
RFRA was passed in 
November  1993 . 5 5  
RFRA calls for the appli-
cation of Free Exercise 
analysis from before 
Smith, including cases 
such as Lyng, which re-
fuse to extend judicial 
protection when govern-
ment action on federal 
land is at issue.56  Con-
gress was thus not at-
tempting to change the 
way the courts interpret cases that deal with governmental land 
management.  Yet, an express aim of RFRA was to create a right 
of action for individuals suffering infringement of their right to 
freely exercise their religious beliefs as a result of indirect, os-
tensibly neutral, government action.57  Therefore, RFRA creates 
a right of action for individuals privately owning land, but not 
when the federal government is managing federal land.  More-
over, since Native American religious practice often occurs on 
federal land, such practices will be subject to greater infringe-
ment than those who practice their religion on their own prop-
erty. 58 
In Yoder, a government policy that risked the destruc-
tion of a religion was found unconstitutional,59 yet in Lyng, a 
government action that posed an even greater risk of this same 
result was found constitutional.60  In Lyng, the centrality of the 
religious practice at issue was recognized by the district court 
and the substantiality of the burden was clear because experts 
believed the proposed action would damage an area viewed as 
indispensable to the religious practice of three Native American 
tribes.61  However, because the proposed action was to occur on 
governmental land, it was allowed.62 
 
 
RELIGIOUS OBJECTS AND OBSERVANCES 
 
Case law has been inconsistent in its treatment of gov-
ernment regulations affecting the use of objects that are used for 
religious observances, but whose use is also regulated by a fed-
eral regulatory scheme.  This inconsistency continues even after 
passage of the RFRA. 
In Employment Div. v. Smith, the Supreme Court held 
that neutral statutes are not unconstitutional by virtue of impos-
ing an undue burden on the free exercise of religion so long as 
the law is otherwise valid and within the government’s preroga-
tive to regulate.63  The Smith Court viewed accommodation of 
religious minorities as preferring one religion over another. This 
accommodation would create a constitutional right to ignore 
neutral laws of general applicability.64  Therefore, the Court de-
cided not to apply the compelling interest test that it had applied 
in cases such as Sherbert and Yoder.65  Rather, a rational basis 
for the regulation was sufficient to pass constitutional muster. 
In Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao Do 
Vegetal, a small religious sect sought a preliminary injunction to 
prevent the federal government from enforcing a ban against 
using a hallucinogen regulated under the Controlled Substances 
Act.66  The district court granted the injunction, and the Court of 
Appeals affirmed.67 
The court applied the Sherbert test because the fed-
eral government was seeking to impose restrictions 
that burden religious practice.68  Under this test, the 
Government failed to show that it had a compelling 
interest in not allowing an exception to the Con-
trolled Substances Act.  Neither the evidence related 
to diversion of the drug away from its religious use, 
nor the evidence as to its adverse health effects was 
strong.69  The Supreme Court affirmed noting that 
RFRA expressly requires an individualized in-
quiry.70  The Court also noted that the Controlled 
Substances Act does make an exception to hallu-
cinogens such as peyote.71 
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in U.S. v. 
Hardman found that a governmental scheme aimed 
at restricting access to eagles’ feathers violates individuals’ Free 
Exercise rights because the regulatory scheme was not the least 
restrictive means possible to accomplish the government’s com-
pelling interest.72  The regulatory scheme required a permit from 
the federal government to collect eagles’ feathers.73  Only mem-
bers of federally-recognized tribes could apply for this permit.74 
As a preliminary matter, the circuit court found that 
because an eagle’s feather is sacred in many Native American 
religions, any scheme limiting access to feathers substantially 
burdened the free exercise of a religious belief.75  In addition, 
the court also found that there was a compelling governmental 
interest to combat spurious claims for eagles’ feathers and to 
protect Native American culture.76  However, the government 
never showed the nexus between preservation of this culture and 
selectively allowing application for permits based on member-
ship in federally-recognized tribes.77  The court found that testi-
mony in support of the notion that the prohibition would help to 
preserve Native American culture was equally indicative of a 
tendency to cause its destruction since the ineligibility of adher-
ents to apply for a permit could just as easily lead to poaching as 
too long a waitlist.78  As a result, the court found that the regula-
tion was not the least restrictive way to preserve Native Ameri-
can Culture. 79 
In United States v. Tawahongva, the United States Dis-
trict Court for the District of Arizona found that a Native Ameri-
can’s freedom to exercise his religion was not substantially bur-
dened by the government’s requirement that an individual seek-
ing to acquire an eagle’s feather apply for a permit.80  The court 
admitted that the permit requirement substantially burdened the 
free exercise of Native American religion in other cases.  How-
ever, rather than making a particularized inquiry as to whether 
the means of achieving the asserted governmental interest was 
RFRA creates a right of action for 
individuals privately owning land, 
but not when the federal government 
is managing federal land.   
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the least restrictive possible, the Tawahongva court merely in-
quired as to whether the defendant’s burden was particularly 
burdensome.81  The defendant only objected to the requirement 
to apply for a permit from the Hopi tribal government, and did 
not object to the need to apply for a permit in general.  The court 
concluded that the burden was not substantial for him.82  Even if 
the burden was substantial, the court nevertheless determined 
that the government has a compelling interest in regulating ac-
cess to eagles’ feathers and the means used to accomplish it 
were the least restrictive possible. 
 
Judicial interpretation of RFRA 
with regard to the use of religious 
objects and religious observances 
in the face of governmental regu-
latory schemes remains inconsis-
tent. 
 
In Smith, the Court rejected using the balancing test 
from Sherbert and Yoder even though the regulation indirectly 
burdened religion.  The Court questioned neither the centrality 
of the practice, nor the substantiality of the burden.  Had the 
Court undertaken the Sherbert and Yoder analysis, it likely 
would have struck the government regulation for not being the 
least restrictive means of accomplishing a compelling interest. 
Mainstream religions had for decades been protected 
from governmental infringement of religious practice via Sher-
bert and Yoder’s analytical framework.  Yet, the Court in Smith 
eschewed that analysis in consideration of a burden imposed 
upon a non-mainstream religion.  After passage of the RFRA, 
the O Centro Court overturned the governmental action in a case 
factually similar to Smith.  Thus, the RFRA can be understood to 
convey greater protection for the free exercise of religion than 
the Free Exercise Clause. 
While the Hardman and Tawahongva courts both as-
sumed that the infringed right was central enough to trigger an 
analysis under the Free Exercise clause, the two courts differed 
as to the substantiality of the burden imposed.  This difference is 
likely due to the Tawahongva court’s subjective inquiry on the 
substantiality of the burden for the defendant.  Therefore, the 
Tawahongva court rejected the defendant’s claim even while 
recognizing that the statute as generally applied substantially 
burdens the free exercise of religion.83 This subjective RFRA 
inquiry involved greater scrutiny of the defendant’s asserted 
injury than courts ordinarily undertake in Free Exercise cases. 
The RFRA protected non-mainstream religions use of 
controlled substances for religious purposes.  However, as in 
Tawahongva, Native American tribes are still unable to freely 
practice their religion as mainstream religions are. 
 
CONFLICTS BETWEEN GOVERNMENTAL MANAGEMENT OF  
FEDERAL LAND AND RELIGIOUS PRACTICES. 
 
Cases involving land use have traditionally been de-
cided in favor of the government, and thus against the free exer-
cise of religion by Native Americans. 84  Though the RFRA did 
not appear to change this analysis, case law may be evaluating 
Native American Free Exercise land use claims similarly to 
mainstream religions. 
In Sequoyah v. Tennessee Valley Authority upheld the 
proposed governmental construction of the Tellico Dam on the 
Little Tennessee River.85  Cherokee Indians claimed the dam 
would flood their sacred homeland.86  The court found that, al-
though the complaint asserted an irreversible loss of Cherokee 
culture and history, these were not interests protected by the 
Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.87 
The Cherokee Indians failed to demonstrate that wor-
ship at Little Tennessee Valley was (1) inseparable from their 
way of life; (2) the cornerstone of their religious observance; (3) 
or that it played a central role in their religious ceremonies and 
practices.88  The land at issue was, therefore, not the theological 
heart of their religion and thus the Free Exercise clause did not 
apply. 
In Badoni v. Higginson, the Navajo sought to order the 
government to lower a reservoir that partially flooded the Rain-
bow Bridge National Monument, a sacred site. 89  The tribe also 
tried to compel the government to issue regulations controlling 
tourist behavior at the monument; and to temporarily close the 
monument to the public, on notice, for religious ceremonies.90 
The court first noted that the government had a compel-
ling interest in maintaining the level of the reservoir because it 
supplied both water and electricity for the region.91  The court 
next stated that a governmental action must be coercive in order 
to potentially violate the Free Exercise Clause.92  Here, the gov-
ernment was not forcing the Native American groups to do any-
thing that was against their religion, nor depriving anyone of a 
governmental benefit for failure to take an action that was ab-
horrent to their religion.  Finally, because the plaintiffs were 
seeking to compel the government to prevent the public from 
accessing areas of religious significance, the court reasoned that 
taking such action would violate the Establishment Clause.93 
In Wilson v. Block, the Navajo and Hopi Indians sought 
to enjoin the clearing of fifty acres of forest to expand the Snow-
bowl ski resort in the Coconino National Forest in Northern Ari-
zona.94  However, they failed to show a substantial burden upon 
their religious practices.95  To show a substantial burden, unlike 
in Sequoyah, this court did not require that the religious practice 
be central to the religion.  Nonetheless, it required that the af-
fected religious practice could not be performed elsewhere.96 
The Wilson Court then considered whether the AIRFA 
protected the tribes from the proposed expansion.97  Based on 
the legislative record, the court found that AIRFA did not create 
any additional rights.  Rather, it merely required federal agencies 
to consider the impact of proposed regulations and actions upon 
Native Americans.98 
More recently, in a similar dispute the Ninth Circuit in 
Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Service overruled the Arizona Dis-
trict Court’s finding that the proposed expansion of the Snow-
bowl ski resort was constitutional under the First Amendment.99  
Contrary to the district court, the circuit court held that the pro-
posed action constituted a substantial burden on the free exercise 
of religion. Moreover, it also held that the government did not 
have a compelling interest in the expansion of the Snowbowl ski 
resort.100 
The owners of the ski resort and the government were 
seeking to expand the size of the resort and introduce artificial 
snow-making.101  Although artificial snow-making expanded the 
ski season, it also entailed the use of treated sewage effluent.102  
The circuit court found that the proposed use of sewage effluent 
would be a burden of the highest order upon the tribes’ right to 
freely exercise their religion.103  The court noted that a burden 
must prevent the plaintiff from “engaging in religious conduct or 
having a religious experience” in order to trigger RFRA analy-
sis.104   Here, the proposed expansion would severely burden the 
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religious exercise of the Hopi and Navajo because it polluted the 
most sacred place of those tribes. Since their religious practices 
require pure natural resources, use of the treated sewage effluent 
would prevent the Navajo from conducting some ceremonies 
and would undermine the Hopi’s entire system of belief.105 
The circuit court agreed with the district court in that 
the government in general has a compelling interest in managing 
public recreational land.  However, it argued that O Centro re-
quires a more particularized compelling interest analysis than 
the lower court employed.  Under that analysis, expanding the 
size and operating season of a ski resort that is located in the 
desert is not a compelling governmental interest. 
The government also argued that it had a compelling 
interest in developing snow-play areas for non-skiers. Without 
these areas, non-skiers were having accidents by playing close to 
the road. 106  The circuit court rejected this argument because 
nothing in the trial record indicated that these safety concerns 
had any relationship to expansion of the resort.107  The circuit 
court found that even if creation of a snow-play park was a com-
pelling interest, introducing artificial snow-making and expand-
ing the resort were not the least 
restrictive means of furthering 
such an interest.108 
The owners of the resort 
also argued that complying with 
the Establishment Clause was a 
compelling governmental inter-
est.109  Therefore, in furtherance 
of this interest, the government 
should not accommodate Native 
American religious practices.110  
However, the circuit court noted 
that the Supreme Court has re-
peatedly held that the Constitution 
requires accommodation, rather 
than mere tolerance, of all relig-
ions.111  The circuit court viewed refusal to allow the proposed 
expansion as a “permitted accommodation to avoid callous in-
difference.”112 
 
The post-RFRA Navajo Nation de-
cision interprets burdens upon the 
free exercise of religion more 
broadly than the pre-RFRA case-
law. 
 
These land use cases hinged on the definition of what 
was a substantial burden on the free exercise of religion.  For 
example, the Sequoyah Court did not view destruction of the 
Cherokee’s ancestral lands as a substantial interest protected by 
the First Amendment.113  Rather, to find a substantial burden it 
examined whether the infringed practice was (1) inseparable 
from a way of life; (2) the cornerstone of a religious observance; 
or (3) central to religious ceremonies and practices.114  Since the 
destruction of the Cherokee’s ancestral lands did not fall under 
any of these categories, the governmental action did not violate 
the Free Exercise Clause.  The Badoni Court analyzed the sub-
stantiality of an imposed burden via whether or not the act or 
regulation is coercive.115  Since the governmental act was not 
coercive, the Court did not find it in violation of the free exer-
cise of religion.  Also, the Wilson Court analyzed substantiality 
by asking whether a given religious practice could not be done 
elsewhere.116  Since the religious activity could be conducted 
elsewhere, the infringement did not violate the free exercise of 
religion. 
The Navajo Nation Court, however, defined a substan-
tial burden upon the free exercise of religion as actions prevent-
ing an individual from “engaging in religious conduct or having 
a religious experience.”117  This definition is broader than the 
definitions provided by the Sequoyah, Badoni, and Wilson 
courts.  A potential explanation for this more inclusive definition 
is that the Navajo Nation case occurred after passage of the 
RFRA. 
The Navajo Nation Court noted that the term ‘exercise 
of religion’ is defined more broadly under RFRA in distinguish-
ing cases that allowed governmental activities that gravely im-
pacted Native American religious practices.118  Before, the Free 
Exercise Clause analysis examined whether an action prohibited 
the free exercise of religion.  Under the RFRA analysis actions 
merely burdening the free exercise of religion may violate Free 
Exercise rights.119 
The circuit court differentiated the Lyng and Wilson 
decisions because of this greater protection 
provided by the RFRA and also on factual 
differences.120  These land use cases 
hinged on the definition of what was a sub-
stantial burden on the free exercise of re-
ligion.  Therefore, while RFRA does not 
change the method of determining when a 
substantial right is infringed, its interpreta-
tion in Navajo Nation marks a post-RFRA 
land use case that protected Native Ameri-
can religious practices. 
 
 
ANALYSIS AND PREDICTIONS 
 
This section will review federal court inter-
pretation of when religious practices are protected from govern-
ment actions or regulations; when governmental action substan-
tially infringes such a right; and what constitutes a compelling 
governmental interest.  Finally, it will predict the direction of 




INTERPRETATION OF KEY ISSUES 
 
In Native American Free Exercise jurisprudence, courts 
have required a higher showing that a practice was substantially 
burdened than in cases involving mainstream religions.  In Free 
Exercise cases regarding mainstream religions, courts ordinarily 
decline any ability to measure the centrality of a religious prac-
tice.121  In many Native American Free Exercise cases, however, 
courts have required the Native American group to prove the 
centrality of the religious practice.  For example, for mainstream 
religions, it has sometimes been sufficient that a religious prac-
tice be in any way affected by a governmental act.122  Con-
versely, in Tawahongva, the court subjectively examined the 
claimant’s burden even when, in general, the act substantially 
burdened the free exercise of religion.123  Other courts have re-
quired that a given practice could not be done elsewhere.  Only 
when these high substantial burden requirements were satisfied 
would the courts be willing to apply the compelling interest test 
In Native American Free Exercise 
jurisprudence, courts have required 
a higher showing that a practice was 
substantially burdened than in cases 
involving mainstream religions.   
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analysis.124 
However, even when this test is applied, courts are 
quicker to find both a compelling interest and that the govern-
ment engaged in the least restrictive means of accomplishing 
this interest in cases involving the government’s management of 
federal land.125  Such an approach negatively impacts Native 
American religious practice because Native American sacred 
sites are often located upon federal land. 
 
 
FREE EXERCISE AND THE RFRA GOING FORWARD 
 
Post-RFRA cases only addressing what the First 
Amendment prohibits the federal government from doing miss 
the point.  The RFRA increases the prohibitions on what the 
federal government can do through the requirement that the gov-
ernment pursue its aim by the least restrictive means possible.126  
Cases that fail to recognize that the RFRA protects a broader 
range of conduct are also misguided because RFRA’s expansive 
definition of ‘exercise of religion’ includes “any exercise of re-
ligion, whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system of 
religious belief.”127 
The RFRA was amended in 2000 upon passage of the 
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act 
(“RLUIPA”) of 2000 to change the understanding of the term 
‘exercise of religion.’128  While the RFRA previously relied on 
the Court’s understanding of the term as required by the First 
Amendment, RLUIPA expanded its meaning.129 
Finally, based on Navajo Nation’s different interpreta-
tion of the RFRA, courts may in the future analyze Native 
American Free Exercise cases in the same manner as the Free 
Exercise cases of mainstream religions.  Such an interpretation 
of the RFRA would provide greater protection of Native Ameri-
cans’ rights to freely practice their religion.  RFRA restored the 
method of analysis from before Smith130 when mainstream relig-
ions received more protection than Native American religions.131  
Therefore, the RFRA alone would not seem to increase protec-
tion for the free exercise of Native American religious practices 
in the land use context.132 
However, Navajo Nation used the RFRA framework 
with the RLUIPA definition of ‘free exercise of religion’ to pro-
tect the rights of Native Americans.  The Navajo Nation court 
seriously questioned the government’s asserted interest in ex-
panding a ski resort and protected sacred Native American land 
from destruction.  Also, contrary to previous cases, Navajo Na-
tion did not examine the individual’s ability to have this experi-
ence elsewhere or the coercive nature of the governmental ac-
tion.133 Rather, it analyzed whether the government had pre-
vented an individual from “engaging in religious conduct or 
having a religious experience.”  Therefore, if Navajo Nation 
indicates a change in the way courts will evaluate governmental 
burdens on Native American religious practices, then Native 
American religious practices may receive the same level of ac-
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